

**Effects, Targets, and Tools:
A Primer for US Strategy and an
Application Examining the Security
Dynamics of Northeast Asia**

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this milestone fiftieth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). For this milestone volume, it is fitting that this paper represents all three pillars of the INSS mission statement. As indicated in the full statement below, the three pillars are quality research, development of a strategic perspective (particularly within the uniformed military), and furtherance of informed discourse on policy issues. Tom Drohan centers his paper on the second pillar, suggesting and developing a framework for use in both teaching and analysis of strategic issues. As the head of the Military Strategic Studies department of the USAFA faculty, Col Drohan does great service to that second pillar, defining a tool for his students and others to use in both teaching and seeking that strategist development objective. The paper also fulfills the other two pillars by presenting the framework through its application to the analysis of a critical region's security situation and a timely set of security challenges to that region and to the United States. The regional security assessment of Northeast Asia is comprehensive, and the development of the Korean nuclear challenge within that regional security context allows both broader and deeper understanding of this dangerous situation. INSS applauds both the research and analysis of the region and its challenges, and particularly the effort to further strategy analysis and strategist development.

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JAMES M. SMITH
Director

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study develops and applies an effects-based model for US security strategy in Northeast Asia. International security theories and broad military strategies shape policy, but strategists need more specific tools. To address this analytical problem, effects-based concepts from military doctrine are blended with general theoretical distinctions to yield an Effects, Targets, and Tools (ETT) operating framework for strategy.

To use the ETT framework, a strategist locates desired effects along two spectra defined in terms of preventing or causing behavior. Desired effects toward adversaries are presented as a spectrum of deterrence-compellence, or defense-coercion, depending on the tools used to achieve those effects. Desired effects toward partners are similarly presented as dissuasion-persuasion, or security-inducement. Targets to achieve such effects are chosen to affect an adversary's or partner's will or capabilities. Tools used to influence targets are defined as psychological, which support the effects of deterrence-compellence (adversary) or dissuasion-persuasion (partner), or physical in nature, which support the effects of defense-coercion (adversary) or security-inducement (partner).

Primary Northeast Asia regional actors are China, the Koreas, Japan, and Taiwan, states that are undergoing profound changes as Asia becomes the epicenter of world economic growth. A primary, region-wide external actor with security implications is Russia. Asian economic recovery is supporting greater military capabilities while multilateralism remains relatively weak. Major strategic issues are a nuclear Korea, remilitarized Japan, modernizing China, and Russian recovery. The specter of a nuclear Korea stokes Japanese remilitarization and pressures China to accelerate its assumption of a regional role. In the short term, Japan's closer ties with the United States boost defensive capabilities and threaten China. A remilitarized Japan encourages a more independent role that casts Japan as a recrudescing predator, at least through the eyes of previous victims. China's rise depends upon a stable regional environment and controllable pace of domestic reforms. Taiwan faces diminishing prospects of independence and the likelihood of unification or uneasy interdependence with a China certain to dominate the region in the long run. Like China, Russia's recovery from its post-Soviet disintegration depends on liberalizing its

political system to stay competitive in the global economy while maintaining internal stability.

Against this backdrop, each state pursues common vital interests of political survival, national sovereignty, economic development, and military capability, in various orders of priority, from perceived threats. Attributing differences of strategic intent is a necessary yet risky step in the strategy-making process. The results of this task are found in an abstract of each major actor's primary interests, priorities, and threats (Attachment 1), providing a foundation for applying the ETT model to three specific cases: the 1993 North Korean nuclear crisis, the 1998 North Korea multi-stage missile launch over Japan, and the current North Korean nuclear crisis triggered in 2002.

The study's conclusions are offered as a regional forecast based on major actors' enduring interests, on strategies based on reasonable intentions, and as recommendations for strategy.

The regional outlook is one of intense competition. Chinese leaders plan to achieve stable great power status by managing market reforms to enhance growth and seeking external stability. Taiwan's primary interest is to maintain its reputation for democratic capitalist resilience in order to attract critical investment flows. North Korean leaders seek to retain independence and will continue to use arms sales and nuclear threats to extract normalization and encourage peninsular unification. South Korea seeks a regional role as balancer among Russia, Japan, and China while seeing reunification with the North as both an opportunity and a threat. Japan increasingly desires to possess international respect commensurate with its economic status, despite a decade of economic decline and regional distrust of its military capabilities. The sheer scope of Russian reforms designed to regain Soviet-era dominance leads to most serious challenges being portrayed as threats to the state.

The need for cooperation and security in this competitive environment highlights the importance of executable policy and the strategist's vital role in achieving desired effects. Lessons learned from strategic interactions in these crises include the importance of integrating regional expertise into the operational planning process;

scrutinizing intelligence and assumptions about strategic intent; considering alternative sequences of actions, reactions, and outcomes based on desired effects, targets, and tools; choosing a proper fit of tools to influence targets; modeling the effect of different tools on the scope of desired behavior; and looking beyond commonalities to identify potential exchanges of interests and security priorities.

By focusing on how strategy operates in a diverse region, the ETT model is intended as a primer on how to make strategy operate in support of desired ends. Further exploration might test the framework's utility for other regions and issues.

